1)
INTRODUCTION
What is an Election Management Body (EMB)
An election
management body is a structure responsible for the organization of elections in
a given country. It handles a greater part of the electoral process, that is, a
greater section of the process which stretches from the registration of voters
to the proclamation of election results. There are four main models of election
management bodies in the world, namely, the independent model (Australia, South
Africa, India, etc), the government model (Denmark, Sweden, United States,
etc), the judicial model (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, etc) and the mixed model
(France, Togo, Germany, etc)
.
In Cameroon, the election management body, which is known as Elections Cameroon ( ELECAM
) , is a mixed model, that is, it has an
independent board which determines
policy issues , while there is an executive department which
ensures the implementation of the
decisions of the board.
This department is supervised by the board which has varying degrees of
supervisory powers. In
a nutshell, Elections Cameroon is a two-pronged structure: it has a legislative
unit which is known as the Electoral board, and an executive unit called the
General Directorate of Elections.
1.1 Historical Background leading to the Setting- up of Elections
Cameroon
Since the return of multi-party politics in Cameroon in the early 90s,
the ruling CPDM (the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement) Government has been
systematically overhauling its sophisticated electoral fraud mechanism or
machinery. This overhauling process has been constantly reviewed to guarantee
victory for the ruling party through political racketeering. It is as a result
of this gloomy or bleak situation that the international community, especially
the Commonwealth, mounted pressure on the Cameroon Government so that it should
instill a spirit of fairness, transparency, freedom, impartiality and
credibility into the electoral process.
This pressure was successful, to some extent, since the Cameroon
Government reluctantly set up an elections observatory known as the National
Elections Observatory (NEO) in December 2000. This structure was just a mere
observatory as its name indicated. Its members just had to observe the
electoral process and make some recommendations for the improvement of the
electoral system. Indeed, they were not empowered, in concrete terms, to call
any electoral officer to order. Furthermore, they could not effectively stop or
prevent any electoral irregularity noticed during an election.
This unfortunate situation prompted the international community (with
the Commonwealth still at the forefront of the pressure-mounting exercise) to
once more, corner the Cameroon Government so that it should comply with its
electoral obligations in terms of fairness, credibility, freedom, transparency
and impartiality. The outcome was the very laborious birth, in December 2006,
of Elections Cameroon which is popularly known as ELECAM.
2) ELECAM AND ITS DUBIOUS RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE MINISTRY OF TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION/DECENTRALIZATION (MINATD)
Issues relating to fairness, credibility, independence, neutrality and
impartiality have always been the bone of contention during elections in Cameroon.
Opposition parties have always decried the lack of fairness, credibility,
independence, neutrality and impartiality during the said elections. As already
seen, The National Elections Observatory has not provided any commendable
solution to the awkward problem of electoral fraud. This unfortunate situation
has been maintained by the ruling CPDM Government.
In order to control the electoral process and avoid any embarrassing
electoral outcome or electoral results that may flush it out of power circles,
the said Government has tactfully re-involved the infamous Ministry of
Territorial Administration and Decentralization in the electoral game. This
re-involvement is clearly enshrined in the amended version of Section 40 of the
Law Setting Up and Laying Down the Organization and Functioning of ELECAM. This
Section states as follows:
“The Ministry in charge of Territorial
Administration shall ensure constant liaison between the Government and
Elections Cameroon. The latter shall in particular submit to it copies of
minutes of meetings and progress reports.”
Indeed, any link or liaison that is created by a structure (MINATD)
which has spent all its time defrauding elections in Cameroon is not to be
trusted at all! Thus, the capacity
of ELECAM to be independent could be questioned. As a reminder, MINATD has so
far been the chief architect of electoral fraud in Cameroon.
3) ELECAM AND UNRELIABLE
ELECTORAL COMMISSIONS
The lack of trust in MINATD, and by extension, in ELECAM, is even
further expressed by an eminent CPDM parliamentarian (Ayah Paul Abine) when he
severely criticizes the Bill (this Bill was finally adopted) dealing with the
amended version of Section 7 of the aforementioned Law, in the following words:
“How can anyone claim to see the independence
of ELECAM when the Bill provides for the mandatory membership of administrators
in all the “commissions for the
revision of registers of electors, commissions in charge of controlling the
establishment and distribution of registration cards, local polling commissions
as well as council supervisory
commissions…?”
Honourable Paul Ayah continues to portray his distrust of ELECAM’s
independence on the basis of the aforementioned amended version of Section 7 of
the Law on ELECAM when he states:
“Few simpletons there are who would see independence
in ELECAM when the amendment provides that the number of the “representatives
of Elections Cameroon appointed by the Director General of Elections Cameroon
(to the last-mentioned commissions)….shall be equal in number to the
representatives of the Administration. Is it not a matter of common sense
that the judicial officer who
automatically has a casting vote as president will, by the allegiance he owes to the President of the
Republic who appointed him, vote necessarily in favour of the “Administration?”
In a nutshell, any election management body in Cameroon which works or
collaborates with MINATD and the various electoral commissions cannot
comfortably talk of independence, impartiality, fairness, neutrality and
credibility. It could only be a replica of MINATD and the said commissions. It
should once more be noted that MINATD and electoral commissions are structures
which have excelled in electoral fraud.
4. THE BUREAUCRATIC NATURE OF ELECAM
ELECAM has some of the characteristics of the para-public institutions
in Cameroon. These traits have ineluctably led to a catastrophic or disastrous
management and even the total collapse or closure of some of the said institutions.
Thus, ELECAM could also experience this situation if its administrative
framework is not reviewed and seriously overhauled. A few of the said traits have been
highlighted.
The first trait is the existence of two structures which connive with
each other to plunder the resources of the para-public institution concerned.
Conversely, these structures could also be at loggerheads due to conflicting
interests. Precisely speaking, the
structures are the board of governors, which is the supreme or supervisory
body, and the managerial unit, which is the executive or implementing body. In
the case of ELECAM, the supervisory body is the Electoral Board, which, inter
alia, approves the action programme prepared by the Director-General of ELECAM
and the progress report drawn up by the said Director-General;
the executive body is the General Directorate of Elections, which implements
the decisions of the Electoral Board.
The second trait is the concentration of a lot of powers in the hands of
the managerial unit, thereby paving the way for excessive bureaucracy. In the
case of ELECAM, the Directorate General of Elections Cameroon wields a lot of
powers. These powers are in the hands of the Director-General who seems to be
the most important officer in the ELECAM set-up.
The dictatorial or high-handed management of the managers of para-public
institutions is well known. The case of the Director-general of ELECAM would
likely not be an exception.
In a nutshell, the bureaucratic or administrative framework of ELECAM
may likely ease the poor functioning of this institution. Any adverse
functional environment would likely have far-reaching or significant
consequences as far as the organization of elections in Cameroon is concerned.
5) Appointment or recruitment of Staff in
ELECAM
As it is the case in most State institutions in Cameroon, the
appointment or recruitment of staff at various levels in ELECAM is not done
objectively. In this connection, many CPDM militants and sympathizers have been
recruited whereas such a structure has to recruit or appoint neutral persons or
civil society personalities. No objectivity in recruitments and appointments
can emerge from a structure whose main officials are appointed by a Head of
State who gives priority to his militants and sympathizers as far as
recruitments and appointments are concerned. It should be noted that ELECAM was
set up without any prior genuine broad-based consultation involving all
political stakeholders in Cameroon. Such a situation can only go a long way to
indirectly update or render useful in the future the following statement made
by Reverend Father Eugene Song:
“At the
electoral level, we regret that the electorate in Cameroon has never been free to choose their own leaders.”
Furthermore, free and fair elections cannot be expected of ELECAM partly
because it promotes a lopsided secondment policy. This policy gives priority to
CPDM militants or those who sympathize with the CPDM Government. In other
words, instead of requesting the transfer of electoral experts (void of party
leanings) from the Public Service, ELECAM prefers to implement a selective
secondment policy so as to favour the ruling party.
6) ELECAM AND FINANCIAL ISSUES
ELECAM is a huge or colossal structure which needs a lot of money or
financial attention. Indeed, a lot of money is needed for the day-to-day
running of its branches at the subdivisional, divisional and regional levels.
To crown it all, its Head Office, as it is the case with the head offices of
State institutions in Cameroon, requires huge amounts of money for its
activities or operations. Furthermore, funding which is normally earmarked for
electoral operations is also very colossal. The Government, which always
complains of lack of enough financial means, cannot obviously satisfy all the
main financial exigencies or needs of ELECAM. This situation is always a threat
to the logistical success of elections in Cameroon, in particular, and in
Africa in general.
ELECAM is under the stifling authority of the Minister of Finance. He
appoints the Treasury Accounting Officer of ELECAM and an auditor to audit the
accounts of ELECAM. Moreover, the administrative and management accounts of
ELECAM are submitted to him annually.
This stifling authority has displayed its shortcomings in many para-public
institutions especially in the accounting departments of these institutions.
These departments have enormously contributed to the financial ruin or demise
of para-public institutions.
Though the budget of ELECAM is within the confines of the law, since it
is part and parcel of the State budget, as it is the case with the budget of
ECN (Electoral Commission of Namibia) whose funds are appropriated by the law
for electoral activities,
it does not entirely ensure impartiality, neutrality and independence in the
activities or operations of ELECAM because, in most cases (especially in
Africa), he who pays the piper calls the tune.
7) ELECAM AND THE REGISTRATION
VOID (DELAYED REGISTRATION AND NON-REGISTRATION)
It is universally
acknowledged that the registration of the names of potential voters on
electoral registers is one of the very significant factors which determine the
outcome of an election. To this end, the CPDM Government has always made sure
that the registration exercise is flawed in such a way that it can obtain
victory even before the start of any election.
The said Government
intends to perpetuate this situation during the ELECAM era. This assertion is
justified by the non-implementation of Section 42 of the ELECAM Law. This
portion of the Law stipulates as follows:
“As and until
Elections Cameroon is effectively put in place, over a period which should not
exceed 18 (eighteen) months, the National Elections Observatory (NEO) and other
relevant electoral State bodies shall continue to carry out their respective
electoral duties.”.
ELECAM is now
effectively functioning whereas no concrete registration of potential voters’ names
on electoral registers is going on. The ruling party knows that any early and
streamlined registration process will herald the beginning of the end of its
forceful rule or stay in power. In other words, it knows that a haphazard and
late registration process will secure victory for its candidates; thus, it is
in its interest to delay the process for as long as possible. It should be
noted that the phenomenon of delayed registration or non-registration is
glaringly against the law, especially during the registration period.
8) THE WORKING TOOLS OF ELECAM
In order to ensure that ELECAM’s gigantic structure functions properly
or without major hitches, it is necessary to have good working tools such as
reliable polling stations, trustworthy voters’ registers, transparent ballot
boxes, a bankable indelible ink, etc.
Instead of obtaining these electoral tools from the right quarters,
ELECAM has decided to move towards MINATD which recently handed over electoral
materials to it. What type of results can emerge from a structure (MINATD)
which provides electoral tools it has been using to systematically defraud
elections? Apart from a few of these
tools such as transparent ballot boxes, MINATD’s electoral tools are fraud-prone.
To this end, its so-called indelible ink and electoral reports cannot be relied
upon. Thus, ELECAM is committing a great mistake by relying on the said tools.
The situation will even be worse when ELECAM will rely on MINATD’s polling
stations and electoral roll. When compared to the Electoral Commission of
Ghana, in terms of producing a good electoral roll, ELECAM has a long way to go
since:
“In its
efforts at enhancing the transparency of its operations, the Electoral
Commission of Ghana has brought many changes and improvements in the Ghanaian
electoral process. The first change and improvement was the compilation of a
credible electoral roll with the active collaboration and participation of the
political parties.”
In a nutshell, it could be inferred that ELECAM is relying on electoral
tools which have failed in their task. These tools take Cameroonians several
years back in the history of elections in the world.
9) ELECAM AND SOME LEGAL
SHORTCOMINGS
In order to have free and fair elections, one of the conditions to be
fulfilled is the setting up of a convincing or credible legal framework. Though
the Cameroonian legal framework has some commendable electoral provisions, much
still has to be done. In order to illustrate the fact that much work still lies
ahead of Cameroonians as far as the improvement of the legal electoral
framework is concerned, the cases of the Law on ELECAM and the Constitution of
Cameroon have been taken into consideration.
As concerns the Law on ELECAM, two examples have been taken into
account. They go a long way to portray the fact that this Law is not a product
of a broad-based consultation involving all the stakeholders in an electoral
process, especially the civil society.
The first example deals with the
amended version of Section 7 of the said Law. It states, inter alia, that:
“The Electoral Board shall hold consultations with the
Administration, the Judiciary, political parties and, eventually, the civil
society within the framework of the management of the electoral process, in
particular, with a view to constituting the joint electoral commissions
provided for by law.”
Taking cognizance of
the fact that the civil society has now become a very pivotal element in the
electoral process, I think that the idea of eventually consulting the civil society is not tenable. In other
words, the civil society, together with other structures involved in the
consultation exercise should be consulted at the same time. It is as if the Law
on ELECAM is striving to eliminate the civil society from the electoral
process.
The second example
concerns the amended version of Section 40 of the Law on ELECAM. This version
stipulates as follows:
“State services
shall collaborate with, and assist, Elections Cameroon in the performance of
the duties assigned to it.”
This version of
Section 40 prompts any vigilant electoral critic to smell a rat since
collaboration between ELECAM and State services is no longer the result of a mere request from ELECAM, as expressed
below in the former version of Section 40, but a mandatory or compulsory
provision bringing together ELECAM and State services. The said former version
states as follows:
“Elections
Cameroon shall receive any collaboration and assistance requested from
Government services for the performance of its statutory duties.”
The aforementioned examples are just a few of the numerous cases of the
legal loopholes in the Law on ELECAM.
As regards the 1996 Constitution of Cameroon, it is unfortunate that the
legal protection of ELECAM is not enshrined in this supreme legal instrument.
This situation clearly displays the fact that much weight is not given to
ELECAM as it is the case with the Independent Electoral Commission of Botswana
which is legally protected in the 1966 Constitution of Botswana.
In other words, expressing the provisions determining or defining a very
sensitive election management body such as ELECAM in a law alone and not both
in a law and the Constitution, or just in the Constitution, smacks of levity or
a tragic-comedy. The Cameroonian Government feels that making personalized
amendments to the Constitution (such as the one which, in 2008, authorized the
Cameroonian Head of State to perpetuate his stay in power through as many
presidential elections as possible) is more important than enshrining non-personalized
ELECAM provisions in the Constitution. What a pity !!!
10) SOME RECOMMENDATIONS
10.1 Short-term Recommendations
The recent electoral
history of Cameroon has been marred by all sorts of vices or rigging ills.
These vices or ills were highlighted by the National Commission on Human Rights
and Freedoms (NCHRF) of Cameroon in the following words:
-
late, and, sometimes,
haphazard delivery of voters’ cards;
-
cases of persons in
possession of many voters’ cards;
-
inaccessibility of some
polling stations to some persons with disabilities;
-
failure to accredit
some representatives of political parties;
-
the controversial
role of some administrative authorities;
-
cases of unsealed or
improperly sealed ballot boxes;
-
cases of multiple
votes during the 22 July 2007 Elections;
-
etc.
These electoral
hurdles, though pinpointed by NCHRF observer teams during specific periods,
that is, the dual Legislative and Municipal Elections of 22 July 2007 as well
as the By-elections of 26 October 2008, limpidly epitomize, in a general
manner, the electoral nightmares Cameroonians have been experiencing.
Taking cognizance of the fact that ELECAM, on the basis of its current
set-up and the prevailing political or electoral dispensation, cannot guarantee
the disappearance of the aforementioned hurdles, I hereby recommend that it
should be immediately disbanded, and a broad-based conference (involving all
stakeholders in the electoral process), convened, to set up a suitable election
management body, a conference that would right the wrongs of the ELECAM Law.
Mindful of the said hurdles, the new election management body should be
a viable or reliable structure modelled on the traits or characteristics of
reputable election management bodies such as the Electoral Commission of Ghana.
Moreover, independent and credible civil society personalities should be
appointed to manage the new structure. These personalities should be allowed to
shun the traits of para-public institutions in Cameroon. They should also set up
bankable supervisory commissions which can appropriately handle electoral
issues, commissions which are all-inclusive, that is, commissions comprising
political parties, the civil society, etc.
The ultimate short-term measure is the immediate setting up of a funding
mechanism that would provide the much needed funds to manage or run the affairs
of the newly created election body. This mechanism should not, in any way,
depend on the Ministry of Finance for the obtainment of its funds. A simpler
and streamlined way of obtaining these funds should be prioritized.
10.2 Medium-term Recommendations
After setting up a credible election management body, a recruitment
policy based on universally accepted standards should be devised. Since
election management is a very sensitive issue, a renowned recruitment firm
should be hired to carry out the recruitment of the staff of the new election
management institution. This recruitment should place civil servants on the
sidelines or relegate them to the background as much as possible. Priority
should be given to electoral experts or those who have a good mastery of
election management. No room for persons with party leanings!!!
After the recruitment exercise, a good training programme should be
designed for the recruited staff. This programme has to usher in a convincing
supplementary election management era for the trainees concerned. The said
trainees have to train those electoral staff who will be temporarily recruited
to work in the field. No room for adventurers in the field!!!
The onus is on the field staff to ensure that the names of as many
Cameroonians of voting age as possible are registered on the electoral roll.
Furthermore, these staff should be involved in the setting up of polling
stations which are not fraud-prone, polling stations which can contribute to
the achievement of ELECAM’s (or the new election management body’s) mission of ensuring the impartiality,
objectivity, transparency and transparency of elections.
No room for amateurish work!!!
10.3 Long-term Recommendations
Trustworthy supervisory electoral commissions should be set up at the
council, divisional, regional and national levels. These commissions should be
manned by credible civil society members. They have to be tactful and shrewd
enough to clear the electoral mess which has been created by the current
regime’s partial or biased supervisory commissions. In other words, the
Ministry of Territorial Administration, political parties, traditional chiefs
and quarter heads should not be members of the commissions that will be set up.
These commissions should be set up during the period preceding the next
Presidential Elections in 2011.
Mindful of the importance of the training exercise in an electoral
system, a long-term retraining programme has to be elaborately designed. This
programme should enable the staff of the newly created election body as well as
the field staff to regularly attend seminars, conferences, refresher courses,
etc, so as to continuously update their skills or regularly build their
capacity. The retraining exercise should take place both at the national and
international levels. A good retraining exercise could ward off the potential
source of civil war created by ELECAM.
The last long-term recommendation is the quest for a self-sufficient
funding source. In other words, the State should, in the long run, be only one
of the funding bodies of the newly created election management body and not the
sole funding body. In this connection, foreign and private funding sources have
to be sought. The funding of the election management body should be rendered
sustainable.
Notwithstanding the devastating nature of the above-mentioned
controversies, loopholes and shortcomings emanating from the ELECAM Law, and irrespective
of the aforementioned recommendations, the said Law marks a slight improvement
when compared to the nightmarish NEO period.
1)
allafrica.com :
Cameroon : ELECAM – Action Now Available at
allafrica.com/stories/200902030598.html (Consulted on:31/03/10)
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Cite this Article: Kijem Yuh, J (2019). The Loopholes, Shortcomings and
Controversies of Elections Cameroon (ELECAM) and its Law within the Electoral
Dispensation of Cameroon. Greener Journal of Social Sciences, 9(2):
45-51, https://doi.org/10.15580/GJSS.2019.2.071019133.
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