INTRODUCTION
According to Huang (2007):
“Pragmatics is the systematic study of meaning by virtue or dependent on, the
use of language” (p.2). Horn & Ward (2008)
define Pragmatics as the study of the context-dependent aspects of “meaning”
which is systematically abstracted away from the construction of “logical
form”. The study of pragmatics is an interesting one. Pragmatics is
interrelated to other fields like semantics, discourse analysis, among many
others.
The aim of this
research paper, which is a review article, is to discuss the historical
development of pragmatics as an aspect of the study of language including the
scope, subject matter or object of study. It also investigates the interface
between pragmatics, semantics and discourse analysis.
History of Pragmatics
The
‘ancestry’ of pragmatics traces back to the works of philosophers like Charles Morris, Rudolf Carnap
and Charles Peirce in the 1930s. The pragmatic
interpretation of semiotics and verbal communication studies in Foundations of the
Theory of Signs by Charles Morris (1938). According to Morris, pragmatics
studies the relations of signs to interpreters, while semantics studies the
relations of signs to the objects to which the signs are applicable, and syntactics studies the formal relations of signs to one
another.
In the semiotic trichotomy developed by Morris, Carnap,
and Peirce in the 1930s, syntax they say addresses the formal relations of
signs to one another, semantics the relation of signs to what they denote, and
pragmatics the relation of signs to their users and interpreters. The trichotomy posits an order of decree of abstractness for
the three braches where syntax is the most abstract, pragmatics the least
abstract and semantics is lying in between. Syntax provides input to semantics,
and semantics provides input to pragmatics.
Linguists like Horn & Ward (2008) argue for a
pragmatics module within the general theory of speaker/hearer competence (or
even a pragmatic component in the grammar), while others like Sperber & Wilson (1986) argue that just like scientific
reasoning—the paradigm case of a non-modular, ‘horizontal’ system—pragmatics
cannot be a module, given the indeterminacy of the predictions it offers and
the global knowledge it invokes.
Huang (p.2) took up Grice (1975) by
elaborating the sense of pragmatism in his concern of conversational meanings,
enlightened modern treatment of meaning by distinguishing two kinds of meaning,
natural and non-natural. He suggested that pragmatics should centre on the more
practical dimension of meaning, namely the conversational meaning which was
later formulated in a variety of ways (Levinson, 1983 and Leech, 1983).
Practical concerns has also help to shift pragmaticians' focus to explaining naturally occurring conversations
which resulted in hallmark discoveries of the Cooperative Principle by Grice
(1975) and the Politeness Principle by Leech (1983). Subsequently, Green (1989)
explicitly defines pragmatics as natural language understanding, which was
echoed by Blakemore (1990) in her Understanding
Utterances: The Pragmatics of Natural Language and Grundy (1995) in his Doing Pragmatics. The impact of
pragmatism has led to cross linguistic international studies of language use
which resulted in, Sperber and Wilson's (1986)
relevance theory which convincingly explains how people comprehend and utter a communicative
act, among other things.
The Anglo-American tradition of pragmatic
study has been tremendously expanded and enriched with the involvement of
researchers mainly from the continental countries such as the Netherlands,
Denmark, Norway and Belgium. A symbol of this development was the establishment
of the IPrA (the International Pragmatic Association)
in Antwerp in 1987. In its Working Document, IPrA
proposed to consider pragmatics as a theory of linguistic adaptation and look
into language use from all dimensions (Verschueren,
1987). After this, pragmatics has been conceptualized as to include micro and
macro components (Mey, 1993).
Throughout its development, pragmatics has been steered by the philosophical
practice of pragmatism and evolving to maintain its independence as a
linguistic subfield by keeping to its tract of being practical in treating the
everyday concerned meaning.
Remarkably in the
1950s, two conflicting schools of thought came into existence within the
analytic philosophy of language. These are the school of ideal language philosophy and the school of ordinary language philosophy. The ideal language philosophy school
originated centrally by the philosophers Goltob Frege, Alfred Tarski and Berfrand Russel. This school
primarily studies the logical systems of artificial languages. In the 1950s and
1960s, the followers of the school of ideal language philosophy namely Richard
Montague, David Donaldson, and David Lewis applied partially its theory and
methodology to natural language which led to the development of toony’s formal semantics. Contrastively, the school of
ordinary language philosophy lays emphasis on natural language rather than the
formal languages studied by logicians. The school of ordinary language
philosophy as led by J.L Austin, H.P Grice, Peter Strawson,
John Searle, and Ludwig Wittgen flourished at Oxford
in the 1950s and 1960s. The emergence of the theory of speech acts as developed
by Austin, and Grices’ theory of conversational
implicative was within the tradition of ordinary philosophy. The school of
ideal language philosophy and the ordinary language philosophy became the
landmarks of the development of a systematic, philosophically inspired
pragmatics theory of language use.
In the late 1960s and
early 1970s, a campaign was launched by some of Noam Chomsky’s disaffected
pupils in genoetire semantics. These pupils namely
Jerry Katz, J.R Ross and George Lakoff who challenge
their teacher’s treatment of language as an abstract, mental device divorced
from the uses and functions of language. A great deal of important research was
done in the 1970s by linguists such as Lawrence Horn, Charles Fillmore, and
Gerald Gazdar to bring some order into the content of
‘’the pragmatic wastebasket’’ as advised by Bar Hillel (1940s). This research
emanates from the search (by the pupils) for the means to undermine Chomsky’s
position. The generative semanticists who were attracted to the philosophical
work by Austin namely Grice, Strawson and Searle,
helped employ what the philosopher Yehoshun
Bar-Hillel called the ‘’pragmatic wastebasket’’. Steren Levinson
pragmatics which was written in 1983 systematised the field and marked pragmatics
as a linguistic discipline in its own right. From then, the field has continued
to expand and flourished. In the last two decades, we have witnessed new
developments such as Lawrence Horn’s and Stephen Levinson’s new-Gricean theories, Dan Sperber’s
and Deirdre Wilson’s relevance theory and important work by philosophers such
as Jay Atlas, Kent Bach, and Francis Recanah. The
editors of a more recently published, The
Handbook of Pragmatics by Horn and Ward (2004) assert that: work in
pragmatic theory has extended from the attempt to rescue the syntax and
semantics from their own unnecessary complexities to other domains of
linguistic inquiry, ranging from historical linguistics to the lexicon, from
language acquisition to computational linguistics, from international structure
to cognitive science.
Huang (p.4) affirms
strongly that “one thing is now certain: the future of pragmatics is bright’’.
Pragmatics
School for Thought
Anglo-American and
European Continental, are according to Huang (2007)
the two main schools of thought in contemporary pragmatics. In the former
conception of linguistics and the philosophy of language, pragmatics is defined
as ‘the systematic study of meaning by virtue of or dependent on language use’.
Its central areas of inquiry are implicative, presupposition, speech acts and deixis. The component view of pragmatics stipulates that “pragmatics
should be treated as a core component of a theory of language, on a par with
phonetics, phonology, morphology, syntax, and semantics’’ (p.4). On the
contrary, the anthropological linguistics, applied linguistics, and
psycho-linguistics lie outside this set of core component. On their part, the
continental traditionists defined pragmatics more
broadly which encompasses much that goes under the domain of socio-linguistics,
psycholinguistics, and discourse analysis. Pragmatics constitutes a general
functional perspective on linguistic phenomena in relation to their usage in
the form of behaviour. This perspective opines that pragmatics should be taken
as presenting a functional perspective on every aspect of linguistic behaviour.
Under this approach, pragmatics is generally conceived of as a theory of
linguistic communication which includes the language of persuasion.
In summary,
pragmatics started in the 1930s with philosophers like Morris, Carnap, and Pierce among others. Morris presented a
threefold division of semiotics namely syntax which deals with relation between
signs and their users interpreters. Analytic philosophy emerged in the 1950s
and 1960s with ideal language philosophy by Montague Lewis, Davidson ordinary
language philosophy with Austin, Grice, and Searle. The pragmatics turn in the
late 1960s and 1970s with the generative semantics like Katz, Ross, Lakoff, works by Horn, Fillmore, Gadzar,
Levison’s pragmatics and pragmatics wastebasket. The
Anglo-American school sees pragmatics as a core component of a theory of
language, on a par with phonology, syntax and semantics. The European continental
school discusses pragmatics as constituting a general functional perspective on
linguistic phenomena in relation to their usage in the form of behaviour.
Others relevant in the historic development of pragmatics include the
functionalists like Charles Fillmore, George Lackoff
and Jerrold Sadock. The Neo-Grecians are Steren Lavision, Lawrence Horn
and Yan Huang while the relevance theorists are Dan Sperba,
Deirdre Wilson and Robyn Carston.
Scope
of Pragmatics
Different scholars
like Mey (2001), Huang (2007), Horn & Ward (2008)
among others have different views as to the various domains or aspects
pragmatics covers but there are central topics that cut across them all which
are speech acts, reference, implicature, proposition,
deixis and presupposition. Horn & Ward (2006) are of the view that the domain of
pragmatics are: Implicature, Presupposition, Speech
Acts, Reference, Deixis, Definiteness and
Indefiniteness. According to Huang (p.2): “the central topics of inquiry of
pragmatics include Implicature, Presupposition, Speech acts, and Deixis”. It is worthy of note that, a regimented account of
language use facilitates a simpler and more elegant description of language
structure. Those areas of
context-dependent, yet rule-governed aspects of meaning include: deixis, speech acts, presupposition, reference, information
structure, implicature and so on.
Speech
Acts
The Speech act theory
was foreshadowed by the Austian philosopher, Ludwig
Wittgenstein’s view about Language-game but is usually attributed to the Oxford
philosopher, J.L. Austin (1962) engaging a monograph, How to do Things with Words.
The identification
and classification of speech acts was initiated by Wittgenstein, Austin, and
Searle. Austin believes that every
normal utterance has descriptive and effective aspects: that saying something
is also doing something. This he calls performatives and he distinguishes them from assertions
or statement-making utterances which he called constatives. In an explicit performative utterance
(e.g. *I hereby promise to marry you*), the speaker does something, which is
that he performs an act whose character is determined by her intention, rather
than merely saying something. Austin
(1962) regards performatives as problematic for
truth-conditional theories of meaning, since they appear to be devoid of
ordinary truth value.
Austin identifies
three categories of acts: locutionary act (basic act of speaking or acts involved in
the construction of speech), illocutionary
act (purpose the speaker has in mind or acts done in speaking) and perlocutionary act (effect of an utterance on the
hearer, or the consequence or by-product of speaking whether intended or not).
Searle’s typology of
speech acts include: assertive or representatives, directives, commissives, expressive and declarations. For a speech act
to be said to be felicitous, its felicity conditions must be fulfilled. These
felicity conditions are the constitutive rules.
According to Stalnaker (p.383), if pragmatics is ‘the study
of linguistic acts and the contexts in which they are performed, speech-act theory constitutes a central
subdomain’. He says it has long been
recognized that the propositional content of utterance U can be distinguished
from its illocutionary force, the speaker’s intention in uttering U.
Implicatures
The idea or notion of
Implicature was originated by H. P. Grice, an Oxford
Philosopher. Horn (p.3) says: “Implicature is a component
of speaker meaning that constitutes an aspect of what is meant in a speaker’s utterance without being part of what is said”. He views implicature
as ‘the-meant-but-unsaid’. This means that what a speaker intends to
communicate is characteristically far richer than what he directly expresses.
Gazdar (1979) offers implicatures as an alternative mechanism in which the
potential presuppositions induced by sub-expressions are inherited as a default
but are cancelled if they clash with propositions already entailed or
implicated by the utterance or prior discourse context.
Presupposition
According to Horn
(1996), the notion of presupposition dates back at least, as far as the
medieval philosopher, Petrus Hispanus.
Gottlob Frege, a German
mathematician and logician is generally recognised as the first scholar in
modern times who (re)introduced the philosophical study of presupposition. It
can be informally defined as an inference or proposition whose truth is taken
for granted in the utterance of a sentence. Presupposition is usually generated
by the use of particular lexical items and/or linguistic constructions called presuppositional
triggers. Some properties of presupposition include: constancy under
negation (which stresses that a presupposition generated by the use of a
lexical item or a syntactic structure remains the same when the sentence
containing that lexical item or syntactic structure is negated), and
defeasibility or canceallability (which posits that presuppositions
can be cancelled by inconsistent conversational implicatures
or can disappear in the face of inconsistency with background assumptions or
real-world knowledge).
In semantic or logic,
Presupposition is a necessary condition on the truth or falsity of statements
but a pragmatic presupposition is a restriction on the common ground, the set
of propositions constituting the current context. Its failure or non-satisfaction results not
in truth-value gaps or non-bivalence but in the inappropriateness of a given
utterance in a given context.
Deixis
Deixis is directly
concerned with the relationship between the structure of a language and the
context in which the language is used. It is derived from the Greek word
meaning ‘to point out’ or ‘to show’. Traditionally, three basic categories are
discussed in the linguistics and philosophy of language literature namely:
person deixis (I, Me, You etc), place deixis (here, there etc) and time deixis (yesterday,
tomorrow, next Thursday etc). Linguistic expressions
employed typically as deictics or deictic expressions
include: demonstratives, first and second-person pronouns, tense
markers, adverbs of time and space and motion verbs. Other types of deixis include discourse and social deixis.
Levinson (1983)
posits that the pragmatic subdomain of deixis or indexicality for example seeks to characterize the
properties of shifters, indexicals, or
token-reflexives, expressions like *I, you, here, there, now, then, hereby,*
tense/aspect markers, etc) whose meanings are
constant but those whose referents vary with the speaker, hearer, time and
place of utterance,
style or register, or
purpose of speech act.
Reference
Speech acts and
presuppositions operate primarily on the propositional level while reference
operates on the phrasal level. Reference
is the use of a linguistic expression (typically an NP) to induce a hearer to
access or create some entity in his mental model of the discourse. A discourse entity represents the referent of
a linguistic expression, that is the actual individual (or event, property,
relation, situation, etc) that the speaker has in mind
and is saying something about.
In philosophy, there
is a traditional view that reference is a direct “semantic” relationship
between linguistic expressions and the real world objects they denote. Under
this view, the form of a referring expression depends on the assumed
information status of the referent, which in turn depends on the assumptions
that a speaker makes regarding the hearer’s knowledge store as well as what the
hearer is attending to in a given discourse context.
If
every natural language provides its speakers with various ways of referring to
discourse entities, there are two related issues in the pragmatic study of reference.
They are:
(i) the referential
options available to a speaker of a given language
(ii) the factors that
guide a speaker on a given occasion to use one of these forms over another.
Proposition
Stalnaker (p.383), posits that Pragmatics seeks to ‘characterize the
features of the speech context which help determine which proposition is
expressed by a given sentence’.
The meaning of a
sentence can be regarded as a function from a context (including time, place,
and possible world) into a proposition, where a proposition is a function from
a possible world into a truth value.
Pragmatic aspects of meaning involve the interaction between an
expression’s context of utterance and the interpretation of elements within
that expression.
THE
INTERFACE BETWEEN PRAGMATICS, SEMANTICS AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
Semantics and
pragmatics are the two major subdivisions of linguistics which are concerned
with the study of meaning. Even though
they are related and have similarities, they have their distinct domains. Huang (p.210) posits two main theoretical
positions regarding the relationship between semantics and pragmatics namely:
reductionism and complementarism. The reductionists abolish the distinction between
semantics and pragmatics. The reductionists are subdivided into those taking
the view that pragmatics should be entirely reduced to semantics (semantic
reductionism) and those holding the position that semantics is wholly included
in pragmatics (pragmatic reduction). The
complementarists are subdivided into radical
semantics and radical pragmatics.
Radical semanticist (philosophers in the ideal language tradition and semanticist
in the 1970s) posit that much of the study of meaning should be attributed to
semantics, while radical pragmatics assimilate as much of the study of meaning
as possible to pragmatics. The complementarist sees semantics and pragmatics as
complementary though distinct sub-disciplines of linguistics.
Lyons (1990) explains
the dissimilarity between semantics and pragmatics in the following ways:
i.
Meaning
versus use
ii.
Conventional
versus non-conventional meaning
iii.
Truth-conditional
versus non-truth conditional meaning
iv.
Context
independence versus context dependence
v.
Literal
versus non-literal meaning
vi.
Sentence
versus utterance
vii.
Rule
versus principle and
viii.
Competence
versus performance
Other dichotomies
include: type versus token, content versus, linguistic meaning versus speaker’s
meaning, saying versus implicating, linguistically encoded versus non-linguistically
encoded meaning, compositionality versus non-compositionality and intention
dependence versus intention independence.
Three of these
formulations according to Bach (1987), as quoted in Huang (212) are
particularly influential: ‘they are
truth-conditional versus non-truth conditional meaning, conventional versus
non-conventional meaning and context independence versus context dependence’.
Truth-Conditional
versus Non-Truth-Conditional Meaning
According to this
formulation, Semantics deals with truth-conditional meaning while Pragmatics
has to do with non-truth-conditional meaning.
This is captured in a well-known Gazdarian
formula in Gadzar (p.2), ‘Pragmatics = meaning –
truth conditions’.
There are a number of
problems against semantics-pragmatics division called the “carnapian
approach”. This approach posits that
there are linguistic forms that do not devote anything and therefore do not
make any contribution to truth-conditional content. Examples include paradiginatic
cases like good morning (greetings),
conventional implicative like but and
imperatives. More importantly, the
linguistically coded meaning of a sentence does not always fully determine its
truth conditions. Again, there is often
pragmatic intrusion into the truth-conditional content of a sentence uttered.
Conventional
versus Non-Conventional Meaning
The demarcation line
between semantics and pragmatics has been defined in terms of conventional
versus non-conventional meaning.
Semantics studies the conventional aspect of meaning while pragmatics
concerns the non-conventional aspects of meaning. A semantic interpretation which is
conventional in nature cannot be cancelled while a pragmatic inference which is
non-conventional in nature can be cancelled.
They are linguistic expression that discuss deictic expressions whose
conventional meaning is closely associated with use. For example, besides, by the way, anyway,
after all, and in conclusion which indicate that there is a relation between
the utterance that contains them and some portion of the prior discourse. The only way to specify their semantic
contribution is to specify how they are to be used.
According to Bach (p.71):
A further point to note is that the conventionality of a
linguistic phenomenon may be a matter of more or less rather than a matter of
yes or no. For example, of the three
types of implicative identified by Grice, conventional implicature
is the most conventional, hence the most ‘semantic’ and the least
‘pragmatic’. Particularised
conversational implicature is the least conventional,
hence the least ‘semantic’ and the most ‘pragmatic’ with generalised
conversational implicature lying somewhere in
between. Simply put, the three types of implicature forms a semantics-pragmatics continuum whose
borderline is difficult to demarcate. It
is therefore clear that there is no neat correlation between the
semantics-pragmatics distinction and the conventional-non-conventional meaning
distinction. All the
semantics-pragmatics distinction is also grounded in the meaning-use
distinction.
A particular
linguistic phenomenon can sometimes be categorised as part of the domain of
either semantic or pragmatics, depending on how the semantics-pragmatics
distinction is defined. This is the case
with conventional implicature. If semantics is taken to be concerned with
those aspects of meaning that affect truth conditions, then the investigation
of conventional implicature falls on the pragmatic
side of the divide rather than on the semantic side since conventional implicature does not make any contribution to truth
conditions. On the other hand, if
pragmatic is seen as dealing with those inferences that are non-conventional,
hence cancellable, then conventional implicature
falls within the province of semantics but outside that of pragmatics, since it
cannot be defeated.
Context
independence versus context dependence
This theory in the
attempt to distinct semantics and pragmatics holds that if a linguistic
phenomenon is invariant with respect to context, then it is the concern of
semantics. On the other hand, if a
linguistic phenomenon is sensitive to context, then it is a topic within
pragmatics. This characterisation however rests on a mistaken assumption that
context has no role to play in semantic. On the contrary, deictics
and demonstratives (pure indexicals) such as ‘I, here
and now’ are on the semantic side which holds that content varies with context.
Bach postulates two types of context as quoted in Huang (p.215) namely: narrow context and broad context which is semantic in nature and denotes any
contextual information that is relevant to the determination of the content of,
or the assignment of the semantic values to variables such as those concerning
who speaks to whom, when, and where.
Broad context which is pragmatic in nature is taken to be any contextual
information that is relevant to the working out of what the speaker overtly intends
to mean. It is also relevant to the
successful and felicitous performance of speech acts, given that
semantics-pragmatics distinction cannot correspond to the context
independence-dependence distinction.
Pragmatics
and Discourse Analysis
To discuss the relationship
between pragmatics and discourse, the term discourse will be examined first.
Stubbs (p.1) defines discourse
analysis in three ways:
a. Concerned with language use
beyond the boundaries of a sentence/utterance
b. concerned with the interrelationships
between language and society and
c. concerned with the interactive
or dialogic properties of everyday communication.
He sees discourse analysis as
ambiguous which could also refer to the linguistic analysis of naturally
occurring connected speech or written discourse. It is an attempt to study the
organisation of language above the sentence or clause but larger linguistic
units such as conventional exchanges or written texts.
Gee (p.1) as cited by Dewey (1933) argues that discourse analysis
is a study of “how the details of language get recruited ‘on site’ to ‘pull
off’ specific social activities and social identities”.
Apparently, "discourse"
is a form of linguistic entity, not a name labelling an academic subject of
inquiry in itself, in contrast to names such as
syntax, semantics and pragmatics. Any stretch of meaningful linguistic units
produced for communication purposes can be described as a piece of discourse,
or any stretch of meaningful linguistic units, when uttered, is a piece of
discourse. Discourse therefore includes conversation (what is spoken) and text (what
is written). There are, among others, conversation analysis (shortened as CA)
and text linguistics. Discourse can be studied or analyzed from various
perspectives, with different commitments and purposes.
Johnstone (2001) according to Dewey (1933) takes discourse
analysis/discourse studies as a number of different approaches rather than one
unified subject. Therefore, DA can be discussed as possibly different subjects,
as discourse analyses, encompassing different methods of DA: formal,
computational, pragmatic, sociolinguistic, ethnographic, sociological, etc.
Pragmatics, as a study of
utterance meaning or meaning in context, is unavoidably concerned with
discourse, not with meaning in isolation, i.e. at word or sentence level. That
is why pragmatics is often listed as one approach (a major approach) to
discourse analysis, because pragmatic concepts are indispensable even in
non-pragmatic approaches. Pragmatics offers the opportunity and possibility of
describing and explaining discourse facts from a linguistic point of view and
in a principled way.
Pragmatics, as well as
pragmatics-oriented discourse analysis, is not to be seen as another component
in linguistics, even though pragmaticians often consider
themselves as linguists (sometimes also as philosophers, semanticists,
sociologists, cognitive scientists, and psychologists). It is a subject
involving interactions of linguistics and other cognitive and social systems. Consequently,
pragmatics should rather be considered a multi-disciplinary area; a meeting
point between linguistics, communication studies, psychology, logic,
computation, philosophy, sociology, anthropology, artificial intelligence,
machine translation, etc. Or it simply belongs to the new science of human
cognition: cognitive science.
CONCLUSION
Pragmatics, according
to Mey (2001) cannot be purely restricted to
linguistic matters because others as agreed above see pragmatics from different
perspectives including the whole of human language use. Other factors that have
to do with the user (extra linguistic factor) must not be neglected. The users
of language in their social context are paramount in pragmatics. Communication
in society via the use of language is the leading agent in pragmatics. It is
clear therefore that pragmatics studies the manner humans use their individual
instinct, languages in communication. The contribution of discourse analysis is
the application of critical thought to social situations. It can be applied to
any text, any problem or situation. This concept (pragmatics) inter relates
with other concepts like semantics (the study of meaning), syntax (the rules of
the ordering of language), discourse analysis among others. They are therefore
complementary to one another.
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